Regulating Religion through Administrative Law: Religious Conversion in Malaysia Beyond Fundamental Rights by Nelson, Matthew J. & Shah, D.A.H.
11
Regulating Religion through Administrative Law
Religious Conversion in Malaysia beyond Fundamental Rights
Matthew Nelson* and Dian A. H. Shah
I. INTRODUCTION
As a basic human right, the notion of religious freedom – including the right to
choose and change one’s religion – is often associated with complex procedural
requirements tied to specific forms of state recognition. This administrative link
between religious identity and state recognition is particularly important where a
change in religion affects one’s relationship with related religious laws or institutions
(e.g., privileged access to religious education or benefits). The balance between a
fundamental right to religious self-identification and the administrative procedures
surrounding state recognition raises challenging questions. When do administrative
procedures amount to an excessive burden and, thus, a violation of one’s funda-
mental rights? What role should states have when individuals decide to change their
religious identification?
Cases of religious conversion are often complex. On the one hand, conversion is
tied to religious profession as a fundamental right. On the other, conversion often
involves forms of state recognition with all of the administrative requirements this
entails: “formal” applications to change one’s religion, notarized declarations,
detailed paperwork, bureaucratic discretion, and so on. These hurdles move beyond
the question of religious profession to include a range of questions about the
manifestation of one’s religious identity within the public realm.
Human rights advocates typically describe the right to profess a specific religion or
belief (religious self-identification) as absolute.1 This is the forum internum aspect of
one’s right to religious freedom (a right to belief in the private realm) as opposed to
the forum externum aspect – a right to manifest one’s belief through public practice
* Both authors thank the participants of the Regulating Religion Workshop held at the National
University of Singapore Faculty of Law (December 16–17, 2015) for their comments.
1 Nurjaanah Abdullah, “Legislating Faith in Malaysia,” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2007), 264,
274. See alsoManfred Nowak,U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPRCommentary (N. P.
Engel, 1993).
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and expression.2 This distinction is evident in numerous international human rights
instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), both of
which provide that matters of public manifestation may be subject to constraints
established by law. The disagreement, however, relates to what a proper limit to
religious manifestation might be. With respect to the forum internum aspect, scho-
lars such as Manfred Nowak have argued that the private practice of one’s religion
(whether individually or with others) cannot be restricted.3 But even this has not
been completely straightforward – even in jurisdictions that guarantee a constitu-
tional right to religious freedom. Constraints are frequently imposed on one’s
individual right to choose one’s religion, including administrative requirements
that constitute a regulatory barrier to the state’s recognition of one’s (ostensibly
private) choice. We focus on this latter aspect of state regulation – the introduction
of administrative procedures that underpin a state’s recognition of religious identity.
Administrative procedures are ubiquitous in cases of religious recognition. But
what counts as a “reasonable” administrative burden? In this chapter, we argue that
administrative and procedural burdens figure as an inevitable feature of state
recognition. However, we also argue that, within this realm, questions regarding
the “reasonableness” of procedures – in effect, questions that lie at the heart of any
effort to understand the operationalization of religious freedom – are historically and
politically contingent. The operationalization of a fundamental right to religious
freedom, in other words, differs from place to place owing to different standards
framing the parameters of “reasonable” administrative procedures.
To demonstrate our arguments, we examine the famous religious-conversion case
of Lina Joy in Malaysia.4 In this case, historically and politically contingent notions
of administrative “reasonableness” emerged as a crucial variable in the state-based
operationalization of religious liberty. But our argument is not confined toMalaysia.
It extends to Jews in London, Christians in the United States, and many other
contexts.5 In all of these cases, the question is similar: when do the administrative
procedures associated with a state’s recognition of religious identity amount to an
“unreasonable” infringement on that identity and, thus, a violation of fundamental
rights? Is there any universal standard to answer such questions?
It is important to stress that registration requirements pertaining to religious
identity are not uncommon. Aside from the Malaysian, American, and British
cases we discuss, focusing on individual religious identity, a study of 153 states with
2 SeeM. Todd Parker, “The Freedom toManifest Religious Belief: An Analysis of the Necessity Clauses
of the ICCPR and the ECHR,”Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 17.1 (2006), 91 and
Anat Scolnicov, The Right to Religious Freedom in International Law: Between Group Rights and
Individual Rights (Routledge, 2011).
3 Parker, ibid. (quoting Nowak [n. 1], 319).
4 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor [2007] 4, Malayan Law Journal 585.
5 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. [2014] 573 U.S.; R v. The Governing Body of JFS [2009]
UKSC 15.
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constitutional guarantees pertaining to freedom of worship revealed that 42 percent
impose some form of registration requirement with reference to religious groups.6
Indeed, among those that constitutionalize a “separation” of religion and state, fully
86 percent enforce laws concerning religious registration.7
In Lina Joy, claims of administrative “unreasonableness” pertaining to religious
self-identification were related to the state’s insistence that, before it could recognize
the identity of a Muslim-to-Christian convert named Lina Joy, Joy would have to
complete a series of procedures that did not yet exist. This administrative burden
struck many as unreasonable. Yet, for richly contextualized reasons deeply rooted in
Malaysia’s constitutional and legal history (specifically concerning the bodies that
might be charged with defining the relevant policies and administrative procedures
underpinning the possibility of state recognition), this procedural burden was
judged to be “reasonable.”8 Briefly, Malaysia’s Federal Court insisted that specific
procedures grounded in deeply contextualized notions of administrative “reason-
ableness” need not imply a total denial of constitutionally protected religious liberty.
In fact, the chief justice who delivered the Federal Court’s majority decision did not
categorically reject the possibility of a Muslim’s renunciation of Islam; he merely
suggested that any person seeking to leave the religion must follow the relevant
procedures for doing so.9 In short, the chief justice noted that religious freedom was
protected so long as each actor – bureaucratic officials, elected representatives, and
private citizens – followed the rules set out in Malaysia to create (and adhere to)
relevant procedures. In Joy’s case, the chief justice merely suggested that, once Joy
had fulfilled the procedures to renounce Islam and the relevant Islamic authorities
had “authorized” her apostasy, she could embrace the religion of her choice.10
To locate the importance of historically contingent notions of administrative
“reasonableness” within the literature regarding religious freedom and human
rights, this chapter offers a close reading of one case – the case of Lina Joy – in
three parts. Part I describes the legal, political, and administrative landscape of
Malaysia as this relates to issues of religious conversion away from Islam, drawing
special attention to Malaysia’s federal structure and its dual court system involving
(a) a hierarchy of civil courts (stretching up to the Malaysian Federal Court) as well
as (b) a hierarchy of state-level shari‘ah courts overseen by state-level sultans who
function as the constitutional Heads of Islam in their respective states. Beyond this
dual court system, some attention is also paid to the constitutional limits faced by
Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts (in terms of their punitive jurisdiction) and,
6 Jonathan Fox and Deborah Flores, “Religions, Constitutions, and the State: A Cross-National Study,”
Journal of Politics 41.4 (2009), 1499, 1509.
7 Ibid., 1510.
8 Lina Joy (n. 4), 607–8.
9 Ibid., 618.
10 Ibid., 612.
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since 1988, the jurisdictional limits faced by Malaysia’s civil courts vis-a`-vis their
review of judgments pertaining to shari‘ah.
Politically, the role of state-level statutory enactments seeking to highlight the
terms of Islamic law in matters of Muslim apostasy will also be discussed, along with
the role of Malaysia’s Department of Islamic Development, or JAKIM (Jabatan
Kemajuan Islam Malaysia), within the Malaysian Prime Minister’s Office. With
support from JAKIM, several Malaysian states have adopted broadly similar admin-
istrative procedures pertaining toMuslim personal law, includingmarriage, divorce,
and conversion to Islam. This push in the direction of national standards, however,
has not affected conversions away from Islam. In fact, different Malaysian states
continue to address the issue of Muslim apostasy in different ways, with some –
including the Federal Territories in which the case of Lina Joy emerged – failing to
address it at all. As a constitutional, political, and administrative matter, this is the
policy-based procedural lacuna that shaped the fundamental rights of Lina Joy.
Part II provides a detailed reading of Lina Joy, highlighting the ways in which Joy’s
lawyers and the Federal Court opted to set aside the language of fundamental rights
in favor of a specific focus on the administrative procedures whereby Joy’s religious
identity was to be officially recognized. Particular attention will be paid to the
policy-based lacuna mentioned earlier and, within this, the legal view that expecting
Joy to complete a set of as-yet-non-existent forms could be seen as administratively
“reasonable.”
Part III examines the literature regarding this lacuna in more detail. Joy herself
suggested that, when officials based inMalaysia’s National Registration Department
(NRD) refused to delete the word “Islam” from her national ID card (a step that was,
in many ways, directly shaped by the procedural lacuna we investigate), they were
performing a “trick” designed to prevent the state from recognizing her conversion
away from Islam.11 Others, however, tied the presence of this lacuna to specific
religious and political factors, including an intrinsic aversion within the Islamic law
overseen by Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts to any recognition for the act of
Muslim apostasy itself.12
After considering these alternative explanations, we offer another account of
the policy-based lacuna that undermined the state’s recognition of Lina Joy’s con-
version, focusing on the relationship between Malaysian legal and political realities
(including powerful ideas about the parameters of a “reasonable” administrative
procedure for Muslim apostasy within Malaysia’s constitutional order). In effect, we
draw attention to an historically embedded set of legal and political disagreements
regarding the promulgation of relevant administrative standards, noting that these
disagreements must be read as a crucial empirical variable connecting a fundamen-
tal right to religious self-identification with the possibility (or the mode) of state
11 Ibid., 620.
12 See Tamir Moustafa, “The Politics of Religious Freedom in Malaysia,” Maryland Journal of
International Law 29.1 (2014), 481.
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recognition in Malaysia. We do not set aside the issue of fundamental rights –
already examined at length in the literature regarding Lina Joy. Instead, we argue
that a deep understanding of local disagreements regarding administrative proce-
dures in Malaysia is essential for those with an interest in grasping the operationa-
lization of fundamental rights as they actually unfold on the ground.
Focusing on the operationalization of fundamental rights in a highly politicized
context shaped by religious norms, we argue that the operationalization of funda-
mental rights is politically contingent insofar as it is channeled through official
procedures framed by deeply contextualized notions of administrative “reasonable-
ness.” Our argument regarding the operationalization of fundamental rights is, thus,
an argument focusing on the primacy of politics. Briefly stated: political considera-
tions underpin the formal legal assessments of administrative “reasonableness” that,
in turn, shape the operationalization of each state’s recognition of a fundamental
right to religious self-identification.
II. CONTEXTUALIZING MUSLIM CONVERSION IN MALAYSIA
To understand the legal context within which Lina Joy’s effort to obtain state
recognition for her religious conversion unfolded, it is necessary to grasp certain
features of Malaysia’s Federal Constitution. The British colony of Malaya achieved
its independence in 1957 from a set of territories known as the Straits Settlements as
well as the Federated and Unfederated Malay States. The Straits Settlements
(Malacca, Penang, Singapore, etc.) were directly administered by the British
Crown, and in those settlements the terms of Muslim personal law were closely
tied to Anglo-Mohammadan law as it had developed in British India. In the
Federated and Unfederated Malay states, however, British representatives worked
with regional sultans, who retained de jure sovereignty with respect to both Muslim
and customary law.13
During Malaya’s anticolonial nationalist movement, many regional sultans were
allied with the United Malays Nationalist Organisation (UMNO), and, after inde-
pendence, the country arrived at a constitutional settlement that provided for a dual
court system separating the country’s centralized “civil” courts from its regional
(state-level) “Muslim” courts.14 Malaya was renamed Malaysia in 1963, and in 1976
the country’s Muslim courts (overseen by hereditary sultans) were renamed as state-
level “shari‘ah” courts.
The de jure sovereignty of Malaysia’s regional sultans with respect to Islamic law
and these state-level shari‘ah courts was preserved in Malaysia’s Federal
Constitution. Article 11(5) protects religious freedom (“subject to public order”)
13 Andrew Harding, Law, Government, and the Constitution in Malaysia (Kluwer Law International,
1993), 13.
14 See generally Hari Singh, “UMNOLeaders andMalay Rulers: The Erosion of a Special Relationship,”
Pacific Affairs 68 (1995), 187.
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even as Article 3 stipulates that “Islam is the religion of the Federation”. Initially,
many of Malaya’s regional sultans objected to Article 3, believing it would encroach
on their religious authority within their respective states.15 However, when it was
explained that Article 3was symbolic – indeed, that the state-level religious authority
of regional sultans would remain firmly intact – they accepted it.16 Separate con-
stitutional articles define the ethnic category “Malay” as composed of persons who
profess Islam17 while, at the same time, providing that certain “Islamic” matters will
be governed by state-level shari‘ah courts overseen by the country’s regional or state-
level sultans.18 Together, these articles mean that matters concerning Islam and the
personal law of those professing Islam are inextricably tied to the terms of Malaysian
federalism and, thus, a delicate balance between Malaysia’s central government, its
regional sultans, and each state-level legislature.
The jurisdiction of Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts is limited to matters
allocated to them by state-level legislative action.19 This action, whether in the
form of a legislative enactment or a fatwa issued by a state-level Mufti, is subject
to approval by the relevant sultan before it can be gazetted and transformed into an
enforceable law. In Malaysia’s Federal Territories (e.g., in the Malaysian capital of
Kuala Lumpur), the pattern is similar to that found in regions such as Washington,
DC. Local institutions – including state-level shari‘ah courts – exist, but it is the
federal government that oversees them. In fact it is not a state-level sultan but
Malaysia’s Yang di-Pertuan Agong (a national “king” elected on a rotating basis
from among Malaysia’s regional sultans) who oversees the state-level shari‘ah courts
in Federal Territories such as Kuala Lumpur.20This is important because the case of
Lina Joy originated in Kuala Lumpur.
A. Muslim Conversion: Legal Debates
The issue of conversion away from Islam – pertaining both to constitutional issues
such as religious freedom21 and to state-level shari‘ah enactments22 – was initially
15 Dian A. H. Shah, Constitutionalizing Religion and Religious Freedom: A Comparative Study of
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. SJD dissertation, Duke University, 2014, 266 (on file with
Duke University Library).
16 JosephM. Fernando, TheMaking of the Malayan Constitution (Malaysia Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society, 2006), 171.
17 Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Article 160(2).
18 Ibid., Article 74. This provision clarifies the legislative powers of Malaysia’s federal and state-level
governments with reference to the “federal,” “state,” and “concurrent” legislative lists set out in the
constitution’s Ninth Schedule.
19 Ibid., Ninth Schedule, List II.
20 For a discussion of the legal, political, and administrative structures surrounding Islamic law in
Malaysia, see Farid S. Shuaib, “The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia,” Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal 21.1 (2012), 85 and Farid S. Shuaib, “Strengthening Administrative Institutions of Islamic Law
in Malaysia: An Overview,” Jurnal Syariah 16 (2008), 443.
21 Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Article 11.
22 Ibid., Ninth Schedule.
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perched in between Malaysia’s civil and shari‘ah courts, with the civil courts main-
taining powers of judicial review. However, since 1988, a constitutional amend-
ment23 carving out an exclusive sphere of jurisdictional authority for the shari’ah
courts – primarily in matters of personal law – has been interpreted to prevent this
form of judicial review.24The amendment, Article 121(1A), was born out of a concern
that the two courts were – as evidenced by several cases – issuing conflicting
decisions.25 As a solution, Article 121(1A) was introduced to provide that shari‘ah
matters specified under List II (ParagraphOne) of the constitution’s Ninth Schedule
(i.e., the state-level legislative list) must be handled exclusively by state-level religious
courts.26 It is an important amendment because, in conjunction with existing
constitutional and federal statutory limits on the punitive powers of state-level courts
– up to three years imprisonment, fines of MYR5000, and six lashes – it means that,
although cases of Muslim apostasy are handled by state-level shari‘ah courts, efforts
to impose capital punishment (regarded, by some, as a suitable punishment for
Muslim apostasy) are prohibited.27 Before Lina Joy, Malaysia’s Supreme Court (as
Malaysia’s highest court was then called) declared that each state legislature was
required to define an administrative procedure for its shari‘ah courts to govern the
23 Ibid., Article 121(1A).
24 See, e.g., Shamrahayu A. Aziz, “Apostasy and Religious Freedom: A Response to Thio Li-Ann,”
Malayan Law Journal 2 (2007), i, v. Cf. Thio Li-Ann, “Apostasy and Religious Freedom:
Constitutional Issues Arising from the Lina Joy Litigation,” Malayan Law Journal 2 (2006), i, xiv–
xvi. Thio argues that it is unclear whether the amendment effectively precludes the civil courts from
adjudicating apostasy cases and that the view that shari’ah courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over
apostasy cases is still contested.
25 Ahmad Ibrahim, “The Amendment of Article 121 of the Federal Constitution: Its Effect on the
Administration of Islamic Law,” Malayan Law Journal 2 (1989), xvii.
26 The provision states: “Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan,
[the state-level list includes] Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the religion
of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage,
divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, partitions and non-charitable
trusts; … [the] creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against
precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List; the constitution,
organisation and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction only over person profes-
sing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph, but shall
not have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred by federal law, the control of
propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion of Islam; the determination of
matters of Islamic law and doctrine and Malay custom.”
27 Within Islamic law, the punishment for apostasy is debated. This issue is not addressed in the Qu’ran;
it emerges in various hadith (sayings of the ProphetMohammad) and, historically, different “schools”
of Muslim jurisprudence have stressed different punishments. See generally, Frank Griffel,
“Toleration and al-Sha¯fi’ı¯ and al-Ghaza¯lı¯ on the treatment of apostates,” Bulletin of SOAS 64.3
(2001), 339, and Yohannan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the
Muslim Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 121–59. In 1990 Kelantan’s Chief Minister
(PAS) pressed for the imposition of capital punishment. UMNO suggested a constitutional amend-
ment to enhance the jurisdiction of state-level courts (thereby avoiding accusations of standing in the
way of shari‘ah); but this idea was later withdrawn. See AndrewHarding, “The Keris, the Crescent and
the Blind Goddess: The State, Islam and the Constitution in Malaysia,” Singapore Journal of
International & Comparative Law 6 (2002), 154, 176–7.
Regulating Religion through Administrative Law 239
process of Muslim apostasy – up to and including discretionary efforts to deter
apostasy within existing state-level punitive limits.28 The Court held that, if states
failed to specify any procedure, this did not actually prohibit Muslim apostasy.
Instead, the Court simply noted that recalcitrant states (or, in the case of
Malaysia’s Federal Territories, parliament itself) would have to frame statutory
rules for their sultans (or the king) to endorse. This ruling stemmed from the fact
that, according to the constitution’s Ninth Schedule, explicit legislation was
required to endow state-level shari‘ah courts with jurisdiction over issues mentioned
on the state-level legislative list. And, even then, state legislatures did not have the
authority to enact just any law pertaining to Islam; they were limited to the
promulgation of laws on a schedule of “Islamic” matters spelled out in Paragraph
One of List II.29 Without specific enabling legislation, in other words, the 1988
constitutional amendment articulated in Article 121(1A) was not sufficient – on its
own – to guide or empower Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts.
Since 1988, however, several court cases have sought to clarify the relationship
betweenMalaysia’s federal constitution, including its state-level shari‘ah courts, and
the question of fundamental rights (with particular reference to the procedures
underpinning Muslim apostasy). These cases framed the legal environment within
which Lina Joy emerged. In 1991, the High Court was asked to decide whether a
person from Selangor who had allegedly converted to Islam had died as a Muslim.30
The Court concluded that, because neither the Selangor Administration of Muslim
Law Enactment (1952) nor the Islamic Family Law (Federal Territories) Act (1984)
specifically mentioned the issue of conversion – in other words, because jurisdiction
over this issue had not been transferred to Selangor’s state-level shari‘ah court by way
of explicit legislative action – the matter should be heard by a (civil) High Court
instead.31 But, in 1992, this view was modified in a case known as Dalip Kaur32
concerning the status of a man from Kedah who was said to have converted away
from Islam before he passed away. In this case, the Supreme Court declared that the
civil courts could not assume jurisdiction, because matters of Muslim apostasy
required expert assessment by a qualified religious authority.33 Because the Kedah
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment (1952) did not clarify the procedural
mechanism whereby Muslims might leave Islam (indeed, because there was no
explicit legislation clarifying the jurisdiction of Kedah’s shari‘ah courts in cases of
28 See generally Dalip Kaur v. Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Another
[1992] 1, Malayan Law Journal 1.
29 Shad Saleem Faruqi,Document of Destiny: The Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia (The Star
Publications, 2008), 134.
30 NgWanChan v. Majlis Ugama IslamWilayah Persekutuan & Another (No. 2) [1991] 1,Malayan Law
Journal 487.
31 Ibid., 490.
32 Dalip Kaur (n. 28).
33 Ibid., 9 (concurring opinion by Justice Mohamed Yusoff).
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Muslim apostasy at all), however, the Court found that Kedah’s civil courts were still
empowered, by default, to render a binding decision.34
In 1998, however, the High Court adopted an entirely different approach, holding
in the case of Md Hakim Lee35 that, even where explicit state-level legislation
conferring jurisdiction on state-level shari’ah courts in matters of Muslim apostasy
was not in place, there was no justification for granting “default” jurisdiction to the
civil courts.36 On the contrary, according to Idrus Bin Harun (a parliamentary
draftsman in the office of the Malaysian Attorney General), Md Hakim Lee held
that jurisdiction in matters of Muslim apostasy lay with the shari‘ah court given its
jurisdiction over Muslim religious affairs, “even if no express provisions were
provided in [a state-level statute].”37 Muslim apostasy was left to state-level shari‘ah
courts, in other words, on the expectation that legislative guidance regarding appro-
priate procedures would be forthcoming: “The fact that the plaintiff might not [yet]
have his remedy in the syariah courts,” noted Harun, “would not make the jurisdic-
tion exercisable by [a civil] High Court.”38
The view in Md Hakim Lee was later reinforced in a landmark case known as Soon
Singh,39 where it was found that although each state (including the Federal Territories)
had explicit laws covering conversion to Islam, only some had provided their shari‘ah
courts with explicit jurisdiction over conversions away from Islam.40 In Soon Singh,
however, the FederalCourt concluded that, in cases ofMuslim apostasy, the jurisdiction
of state-level shari‘ah courts could be implied given the special religious expertise
required to judge such cases.41 This approach was taken to a different level in a
subsequent case known as Shaik Zolkaffily,42 wherein the Federal Court held that
where jurisdiction over a specific issue had been conferred to the shari‘ah courts – either
explicitly or implicitly – but no legal remedy had been specified (by statute) within those
courts, it was still the state legislature that was expected to determine the legal remedy
within the shari’ah courts.43 In other words, “the fact that [a litigant] did not [yet] have his
remedy in the syariah court would not make the jurisdiction exercisable by the civil
court.”44 This is the jurisprudential background that set the stage for Lina Joy.
34 Ibid., 7.
35 Md Hakim Lee v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur[1998] 1, Malayan Law
Journal 681.
36 Ibid., 689.
37 Dato Idrus bin Harun, “Interaction between Syariah Law and Civil Law,” Inaugural Annual Events
(IAE) of the AGCs, Singapore, March 23–25, 2006.
38 Ibid.
39 Soon Singh v. Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah [1999] 1, Malayan Law
Journal 489.
40 Ibid., 501.
41 Ibid., 502.
42 Majlis Ugama Islam Pulau Pinang dan Seberang Perai v. Shaik Zolkaffily bin Shaik Natar & Others
[2003] 3, Malayan Law Journal 705.
43 Ibid., 719.
44 Ibid.
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During the 1980s and 1990s, several states passed laws specifying a procedure
concerning Muslim apostasy to be overseen by their state-level shari‘ah courts. In
Pahang, Perak, Malacca, and Sabah, these enactments identified Muslim apostasy as
an offense – for example, an “offense by persons professing … Islam against the
precepts of that religion” (Constitution of Malaysia, Ninth Schedule, List II,
Paragraph One) – to be punished with fines and/or imprisonment.45 But, in Negeri
Sembilan, steps were put in place allowing state-level shari‘ah courts to oversee the
process of Muslim apostasy (including three months of counseling and a further one-
year cooling-off period) before an official certification of Muslim apostasy could be
issued.46 And, in Johor, the unreported case of Ismail bin Suppiah47 decided by the
Kuala LumpurHighCourt noted that, as per the (now-repealed) Johor Administration
of Islamic Law Enactment (1978), the chief kadi was simply expected to play a
mechanical role in registering the non-Muslim name of any Johor-based Muslim
who declared himself an apostate.48 In the Administration of Islamic Law (Federal
Territories) Act (1993) and at least four other states, however, the issue of Muslim
apostasy was not addressed. The question underpinning the case of Lina Joy was
therefore as follows: why did this statutory (and, thus, procedural) lacuna persist in
Malaysia’s Federal Territories even after the Federal Court clearly urged it to be filled?
This is the procedural question that underpinned specific concerns about the admin-
istrative operationalization of religious freedom in Malaysia.
B. Muslim Conversion: Political Debates
Apart from this jurisprudential and legislative context, it is important to appreciate
the larger political context within which Malaysian cases of Muslim apostasy were
addressed. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, much depended on a
pattern of electoral competition between two leading political parties: the right-of-
center UnitedMalays National Organization (UMNO) – the dominant collaborator
in a ruling coalition known as the Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front – and
the religiously conservative (Islamist) Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). Since its
inception in the early 1950s, PAS projected itself as the only truly “Islamic” party
in Malaysia, vowing to form an Islamic state in which only Muslims would hold
political power.49 In fact, for much of the country’s history, and especially since the
late 1970s when social and political movements took on a more overtly religious
45 See, e.g., Crimes (Syariah) Enactment 1992 (Enactment No. 3 of 1992), Sections 12 and 13, and the
Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay Custom of Pahang Enactment 1982, Sections
103 and 185.
46 Administration of the Religion of Islam (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 2003, Section 119.
47 Ismail bin Suppiah v. Ketua Pengarah Pendaftaran Negara (R-1-24-31-95) (unreported case).
48 See the Johor Faith Protection Bill 2000, which resembled a bill passed that year in Perlis.
49 Andrew Harding, “Sharia and National Law in Malaysia,” in Jan Michiel Otto (ed.), Sharia
Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and
Present (University of Chicago Press, 2010), 502–3.
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character, UMNO and PAS competed for Malay-Muslim votes – especially in the
north and east of the country (a.k.a. Malaysia’s Malay-Muslim “heartland”).50
Central to this ongoing electoral competition has been a push to construct a
cohesive Malay-Muslim constituency by “defending” the boundaries of Islam or, at
least, appearing to defend Muslim interests. UMNO and PAS, in other words, have
frequently sought to “out-Islamize” one another by highlighting issues that touch on
Malay-Muslim religious and political sensitivities.51 This competitive posture
stretches all the way from policing various forms of religious orthodoxy to discoura-
ging Muslim apostasy. The government’s emphasis on Islam, for instance, was
officially expressed during UMNO’s 1982 General Assembly, when Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad stressed that UMNO would ensure Malay-Muslim adherence
to various Islamic teachings.52 In fact, certain reform initiatives took place even
before Mahathir assumed office. At the federal level, for instance, the government
established a National Council for Islamic Affairs (Pusat Islam) under the
Department of Religion, which was later reorganized in the office of Prime
Minister Mahathir as Malaysia’s Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM).53
Within Malaysia, each state maintains its own Islamic affairs department. However,
JAKIM has become increasingly influential over time in coordinating interstate
Muslim affairs (particularly insofar as states have become more and more reliant on
funds derived from the center).54 Today, JAKIM’s wide-ranging role extends from
the vetting of Friday sermons across Malaysia to the issuance of national procedures
for determining the end of Ramadan. In the past, the end of Ramadan was deter-
mined by states using visual sightings of the moon and/or astronomical calcula-
tions.55 But, when Prime Minister Mahathir stepped in to centralize this moon-
sighting process, he reinforced deep-seated federal–state tensions as well as the terms
of an enduring rivalry betweenMalaysia’s national executive and its various regional
sultans.56
JAKIM also recommends draft laws for state-level enactment.57 In fact, given its
persistent political dominance across Malaysia during the 1980s and 1990s (except in
50 Shah (n. 15), 344.
51 Ibid., 386.
52 Gordon P. Means, Political Islam in Southeast Asia (Lynne Rienner, 2009), 126.
53 Ibid.
54 SeeMaznahMohamad, “The Ascendance of Bureaucratic Islam and the Secularization of the Sharia
in Malaysia,” Pacific Affairs 83.3 (2010), 505.
55 Means (n. 52), 128.
56 Means suggests that Mahathir overstepped the boundaries of his executive authority because Malay
rulers possess “constitutionally defined powers … over matters related to Islam.” Means (n. 52), 128.
However, Shad Faruqi notes that not everything concerning Islam is reserved to the states. Shad
Saleem Faruqi, “Jurisdiction of State Authorities to Punish Offences against the Precepts of Islam: A
Constitutional Perspective,” The Malaysian Bar (September 24, 2005), www.malaysianbar.org.my/
constitutional_law/jurisdiction_of_state_authorities_to_punish_offences_against_the_precepts_of_i
slam_a_constitutional_perspective.html (accessed September 2, 2015).
57 Means (n. 52), 126.
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Kelantan, where PAS won state-level elections in 1990), the ruling BN found it
relatively easy to standardize state-level laws concerning various aspects of Islam.
Indeed, even within Malaysia’s federalized approach to Islam, the link between
federal and state-level party politics has generally ensured that shari‘ah-based poli-
cies governing marriage, the administration of Islam, and certain civil and criminal
procedures (albeit not Muslim apostasy) were gradually harmonized over time. But,
with reference to the focus of this article (Muslim apostasy), the question is: why did
this steady march of standardization fail? Moreover, turning to Lina Joy, why was the
procedural lacuna left by this failure seen as legally (and administratively)
“reasonable”?
III. UNDERSTANDING LINA JOY: FROM FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By the time Lina Joy reached Malaysia’s Court of Appeal and, then, Malaysia’s
Federal Court, Joy’s quest to obtain state recognition for her religious conversion –
by deleting the word “Islam” from her national ID card – was explicitly framed as a
case of administrative law rather than fundamental rights. The facts were simple.
Initially, Azalina binti Jailani (a.k.a. “Lina Joy”) applied to change the name on her
ID card (which did not mention her religion), stating that the reason for this change
was a “change of religion” from Islam to Christianity. Her application, however, was
denied, and Joy was advised to apply again, stating that the reason for her change of
name was her “choice” of religion. This time her request was granted, and she
received a new ID card with her new name.
Unfortunately, this new card also included her old name on the back. And, owing
to a legislative amendment that had come into effect while Joy’s application for a
new ID card was being processed, her new card also included a description of her
religion as “Islam.” (The intervening piece of legislation required that every national
ID card must specify a Muslim’s religion as Islam; and, along the way, the National
Registration Department [NRD] claimed that, while it recognized Lina Joy’s new
name, it had no authoritative documentary evidence stating that Joy had renounced
Islam.58) When Joy applied to delete the word “Islam” from her ID card, she was
ordered to follow the procedures spelled out in Malaysia’s National Registration
Regulations 1990 (hereinafter, the “1990 Regulations”), which provided her with a
set of forms requiring any Muslim applying for a change of name to specify their
religion and, then, to provide “[a]ny further documentary evidence as the registra-
tion officer may consider necessary to support the accuracy of any particulars
submitted.”59
58 The same piece of legislation specified that, among the “reasons” given by those seeking to change
their name, “change of religion” was no longer permitted.
59 National Registration Regulations 1990, clause 4(c)(x).
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When Joy submitted her forms specifying her religion as “Kristian” (along with a
copy of her baptismal certificate), the presiding NRD officer made a notation saying
that the religion of the applicant should be retained as Islam because, scanning the
NRD records, there was no authoritative documentary evidence stating that, before
Joy became a Christian, she had officially abandoned Islam.60 A mere assertion of
religious identity by a private citizen (or a recognized religious authority – in this
case, the church that issued Joy’s baptismal certificate) was not enough. Instead, the
state required a three-way combination of (a) individual self-assertion (i.e., indivi-
dual profession), (b) an acknowledgement by relevant religious authorities (insofar
as each religious community inMalaysia was constitutionally entitled to “manage its
own … affairs” [Article 11(3)(a)]), and above all, (c) some type of formal process
officially recognized by the state itself. InMalaysia, following the “implied” jurisdic-
tion spelled out in Soon Singh, it was the formal administrative procedure associated
with this last element that required Joy, as one seeking to leave Islam, to approach a
state-level shari‘ah court.
Joy insisted that, as per the form she was asked to complete, her baptismal
certificate was sufficient to support “[t]he accuracy of any particulars sub-
mitted,”61 since the particulars actually submitted concerned her status as a
Christian. However, the NRD contended that, insofar as Joy was seeking to
delete the word Islam from her ID card (and, thus, to change her status from
what was in the NRD records), the only satisfactory evidence was a certificate
of apostasy from a relevant shari‘ah court.62 From Joy’s perspective, as a person
no longer professing Islam, she was not subject to the jurisdiction of Malaysia’s
shari’ah courts. However, the NRD argued that it was not her professed status
as a “Kristian” but her earlier effort to abandon Islam that was at issue (in
deleting the word “Islam”). And, as such, the NRD argued that the procedure
for adjudicating this act of renunciation – by implication, because the
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act (1993) did not mention
Muslim apostasy – involved the shari‘ah court.
In effect, the question before the Court was regarded as a routine matter of
administrative law, albeit one that underpinned the operationalization of a funda-
mental constitutional right: did the NRD act “reasonably” (i.e., within a defensible
understanding of administrative discretion) when it required Joy to obtain a certifi-
cate of apostasy from a shari‘ah court before deleting the word Islam from her ID
card? The case was explicitly framed as a case of “Wednesbury” (un)reasonableness,
asking whether the administrative decision taken by the NRDwas wrong, capricious,
perverse, or absurd – indeed, in the language of the Court of Appeal of England and
60 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan and Others [2005] 6, Malayan Law Journal
193, 202.
61 Lina Joy (n. 4), 629.
62 Ibid., 627.
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Wales inWednesbury Corp63 “[s]o unreasonable that no reasonable authority could
have ever come to it.”64
Malaysia’s Federal Court, by a 2:1 majority, concurred with Malaysia’s Court of
Appeal and concluded that, in an administrative sense, the NRD had acted “reason-
ably” for at least three reasons. First, the Court argued that the NRD’s insistence on
authoritative evidence from the shari‘ah court confirming that Joy was no longer a
Muslim was “reasonable.”65 In particular, the chief justice argued that a mere
statutory declaration issued by a person leaving the religion was not enough.66
Because renouncing Islam was thought to implicate the terms of Islamic law, it
was perfectly reasonable for the NRD to require confirmation from the relevant
Islamic authorities who were thought to possess the expertise required to adjudicate
such matters. In fact, the Court added that if the NRD had accepted a person’s “self-
declaration” on its own, the NRD might be at risk of “wrongly” designating some-
one’s affiliation with a particular religious group.67
Second, agreeing withMalaysia’s Court of Appeal, the Federal Court conceded that
the relevant Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act (1993) granting
jurisdiction to the shari‘ah courts in various matters did not provide any guidance
regarding the procedures governing Muslim apostasy. Yet, following Soon Singh, the
Court declared that the jurisdiction of the shari‘ah courts was “implied.”68 In fact, as
per Md Hakim Lee, the Court accepted the conservative view that the judiciary must
avoid filling legislative lacunae on its own; the courts were simply obliged to encourage
each state-level legislature to satisfy its own legal role in specifying the relevant
procedures.69 In effect, the Court argued that it was legally “reasonable” to expect
each actor withinMalaysia’s constitutionally defined legal-cum-administrative order to
play its required part. The alternative – arrogating legislative powers to theCourt on the
premise that a radical commitment to institutional centralization was required to
ensure a defense of fundamental rights – was rejected. This was because such a
move was seen as undermining the underpinnings of Malaysia’s constitutional order
(including its approach to federalism and a constitutional separation of powers).70
Third, it is important to stress that the 1990 Regulations did not offer any clear
guidance as to what must be provided to correct erroneous particulars on an ID card.
Instead, the Court declared that it was within the administrative discretion of each
NRD officer to determine which documentary evidence was required “[t]o support
the accuracy of any particulars submitted”71 and that, in cases of Muslim apostasy, it
63 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation (1948) 1 K.B. 223.
64 Ibid., 234.
65 Lina Joy (n. 4), 604.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 603.
68 Ibid., 616–18.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 618.
71 Ibid., 603.
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was administratively “reasonable” in light of prevailing jurisprudence to expect some
type of certification from Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts.72 The Court stressed
that determining the question of whether a person had renounced Islam was not
within the jurisdiction of the NRD and that it was not something “[t]he NRD is …
equipped or qualified to decide.”73 In fact the Court in Lina Joy held that, even
when a certificate of apostasy was furnished before the NRD, each NRD officer still
possessed the discretion to retain or remove the word “Islam” from an ID card.74 In
Lina Joy, the relationship between fundamental rights and administrative discretion
(and judicial deference to such discretion) was made abundantly clear.
For comparative purposes, it is interesting to note that at no point did the Court
explicitly state that Lina Joy could not change her religion (in keeping with the
fundamental rights outlined in Article 11 of the Malaysian constitution). On the
contrary, the Court simply came to the conclusion that Joy’s exercise of this freedom
in Malaysia was subject to the relevant state regulations.75 For the Court, exercising
one’s rights under Article 11 (as a Muslim) simply required compliance with
Malaysia’s laws and procedures associated with the renunciation of Islam.76 In
short, the exercise of Joy’s religious freedom could not be recognized by the state
unless specific procedures were followed – procedures closely tied to Malaysia’s
federal constitutional order and the legal authority of its state-level shari‘ah courts.
IV. LINA JOY: RIGHTS VS. REASONABLENESS?
Lina Joy argued that the NRD’s actions amounted to a form of trickery preventing
the state from officially recognizing her conversion. In her submissions at trial (in
the High Court), Joy documented an unfruitful back-and-forth with the NRD. The
NRD rejected – without articulating any reason – her first application for a change of
name (in which she stated that her reason for this change was her renunciation of
Islam).77 She put in a second application almost two years later (again citing
conversion as the reason for her name change), but this time the NRD did not
respond.78 She subsequently enquired about the status of her application, where-
upon she was told not to disclose her conversion to avoid any difficulties with her
application.79 In fact it was this advice that led Joy to submit a third application,
which was subsequently approved (albeit with a new ID card that specified her
religion as “Islam”).80 The dissenting judgment prepared by Justice Richard
72 Ibid., 604.
73 Ibid., 602.
74 Ibid., 604.
75 Ibid., 612.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 620.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 621.
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Malanjum, focusing heavily on the constitutionality of the 1990 Regulations and the
matter of official discretion, stressed this protracted series of interactions.81 In fact,
taking up the question of administrative “reasonableness,” Malanjum noted that,
within Malaysia’s existing policy framework, Joy had been faced with an extremely
difficult administrative process followed by an almost impossible additional require-
ment.82 This requirement required Joy to follow a set of procedures concerning the
work of a relevant state-level shari‘ah court – a statutory set of procedures that, within
Malaysia’s Federal Territories, did not (yet) exist.
A. Proceduralizing Apostasy
Malanjum began his dissenting judgment by accepting that the NRD official who
handled Joy’s case was entitled to request any documentary evidence “[n]ecessary to
support the accuracy of any particulars submitted.”83 He simply reiterated that the
particulars actually submitted concerned Joy’s identity as a Christian – hence her
baptismal certificate – rather than her status as an ex-Muslim. There was an “abuse
of power,” he noted, when the NRD “[f]ailed to take into consideration a legally
relevant factor, namely … the documents submitted by the appellant, … preferring
[instead] its policy of requiring a certificate of apostasy from the Federal Territory
Syariah Court.”84 This policy – according to Malanjum – was not a step that had
been stipulated in the 1990 Regulations. Indeed, turning specifically to the question
of “Wednesbury” (un)reasonableness, he drew attention to the matter of completing
a set of forms that did not exist.85 For Malanjum, the NRD’s insistence on a
certificate of apostasy from the Federal Territory shari‘ah court was not only illegal
but also administratively unreasonable, “[b]ecause under the applicable [state-level]
law, the Syariah Court in the Federal Territory has no statutory power to adjudicate
on the issue of apostasy.”86 In short, he noted that the NRD “[r]equired the
performance of an act that was almost impossible to perform.”87
81 Ibid., 625–30. Justice Malanjum added: “[T]he conclusion in the majority judgment that the
impugned policy adopted by NRD was reasonable within the test of Wednesbury Corporation v.
Ministry of Housing (1966) 2 Q.B. 275 has unfortunately missed one cardinal principle. The imple-
mentation of the policy has a bearing on the appellant’s fundamental constitutional right to freedom
of religion under Article 11 of the Constitution. Being a constitutional issue it must be given priority
independent of any determination of the Wednesbury reasonableness; … before it can be said that a
policy is reasonable within the test of Wednesbury its constitutionality must be first considered.”
Ibid., 631.
82 Ibid., 632.
83 Lina Joy (n. 4), 626.
84 Ibid., 630.
85 In Malaysia, different rules for different groups are constitutionally permitted in the context of
religious personal law. However, Malanjum focused on a rule pertaining only to “Muslims” (whose
ID cards had to “state their religion”); he described this as a case of discrimination beyond the realm of
Muslim personal law. See ibid., 639.
86 Ibid., 632.
87 Ibid., 644.
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This statutory lacuna pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Federal Territory’s
shari‘ah courts thus became the central issue in Lina Joy. Did the NRD exercise
its administrative discretion in a “reasonable” manner when it sought to chart a
course between (a) the statutory silence of the Federal Territories regarding the work
of its shari‘ah courts in cases ofMuslim apostasy and (b) the guiding jurisprudence of
Soon Singh regarding the implied jurisdiction of those very shari‘ah courts?
Crucially, Malanjum did not seek to erase the silence of the Federal Territories by
legislating from the bench; instead, he adhered to the work of his predecessors in
continuing to press for the promulgation of clearly defined laws in each state. In
particular, he stressed that, in cases regarding Muslim apostasy (and, thus, funda-
mental rights), jurisdiction should never be “implied.” Following Dalip Kaur
(1997), he returned to questions of policymaking and noted that clearly defined
procedural guidance should be incorporated “[i]n all state enactments to avoid [any]
difficulties of interpretation.”88
B. Regulating Apostasy: State-Level Variation
Outside of Malaysia’s courts, however, this case raised one of the most important
questions in Malaysia’s constitutional and political order: to what extent should
various states, including the Federal Territories, be compelled to confront the issue
of Muslim apostasy via explicit state-level enactments and, even beyond this, to what
extent should state-level policies reflect a particular “national” standard? Indeed, if
such policies were to reflect a national standard, which standard could be said to
reflect an (administratively) “reasonable” standard for regulating – and recognizing
– Muslim apostasy?
Focusing on the punitive procedures in Pahang (where would-be apostates were
seen as committing a crime and punished with the maximum state-level punish-
ment of six lashes, aMYR5000 fine, and three years’ imprisonment), some perceived
a basic aversion to any legalization of Muslim apostasy. Former Australian High
Court JudgeMichael Kirby andMalaysian scholars such as Nurjaanah Abdullah, for
instance, read Lina Joy’s emphasis on the power of state-level shari‘ah courts as,
prima facie, a denial of fundamental rights. To protect fundamental rights, they
noted, such cases regarding apostasy should be removed from the shari‘ah courts and
returned to the civil courts forthwith.89For Abdullah, the problem lay in the fact that
it was virtually impossible to get the required validation from a shari‘ah court in most
states, as references to such courts were “not merely an administrative or procedural
requirement … [but a] control mechanism over individuals who wish to renounce
[Islam].”90 Abdullah added that the very existence of cumbersome shari‘ah-court
88 Ibid., 650.
89 Michael Kirby, “Fundamental Human Rights and Religious Apostasy: The Malaysian Case of Lina
Joy,” Griffith Law Review 17.1 (2008), 151, 156; Abdullah (n. 1), 281.
90 Abdullah (n. 1), 283.
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procedures was inappropriate in religious freedom cases, as such procedures
patently and often willfully “ignore … the reality that whether or not a person has
renounced Islam is … a question of fact [and] not of law.”91
This notion – that state recognition should resemble a frictionless conduit
through which religious self-identification could be validated strictly on the basis
of an individual’s autonomous “choice” of religion – was, however, considered
administratively problematic. In fact the judicial majority in Lina Joy directly
addressed the problems with this view, arguing that such an approach might have
the effect of allowingMuslims to renounce Islammerely to avoid certain constraints
associated with Muslim personal law (e.g., constraints on the production of a will
excluding certain heirs). Similarly, the trial judge in Lina Joy suggested in the High
Court that a complete absence of administrative regulation – that is, an ability to
renounce Islam without going through any religious body – would be problematic
insofar as Malaysia’s constitution explicitly allowed each religious group to “manage
its own … affairs” (Article 11(3)(a)).92
Amore nuanced view, however, pressing for a sharply limited set of constraints on
Muslim apostasy within Malaysia’s shari‘ah courts, was articulated by Justice
Malanjum, who referred to the (now defunct) procedure previously adopted in
the state of Johor according to which the powers of a state-level shari‘ah court
were limited to “registering” individual declarations of conversion.93 In a similar
vein, states like Negeri Sembilan recommended a rather limited set of procedures
within which, after attending three months of rehabilitative counseling followed by
a one-year cooling-off period (to consider repentance), apostates could expect to
receive an official certificate of apostasy issued by the shari‘ah court.
These divergent approaches to the proceduralization of Muslim apostasy –
stretching all the way from “punitive” Pahang (where existing procedures seemed
to overlap with outright prohibition) to “permissive” Negeri Sembilan (where this
was not the case) – are important.94 They are particularly important when it comes
to considering what sort of explicit state-level enactments might be introduced in the
context of future efforts to move beyond the “implied” jurisdiction in Soon Singh.
However, as comparative examples, they still ignore the core political question that
91 Ibid.
92 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Another [2004] 2, Malayan Law Journal 119, 126.
93 “A clear provision,” Malanjum noted, could “[i]mpose an obligation on the relevant authority to …
maintain a register of converts who… executed a deed poll renouncing Islam”, Lina Joy, n. 4, 654. In
the end, Malanjum stressed the inevitable overlap between fundamental rights and questions about
the “reasonableness” of the administrative procedures operationalizing those rights. He argued that
the latter should never stifle the former.
94 Two cases are instructive in this respect. Daud bin Mamat and Kamariah bte Ali emerged in
Kelantan, which (unlike the Federal Territories that framed Lina Joy) has an enactment specifying
the procedures for apostasy. In Daud bin Mamat, the civil court decided that the appellant had to
complete a set of required shari‘ah-court procedures that he had not yet done. See Daud bin
Mamat & Others v. Majlis Agama Islam & Another [2001] 2, Malayan Law Journal 390 and
Kamariah bte Ali v. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan & Another [2002] 3, Malayan Law Journal 657.
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confronted Lina Joy, namely, why did Malaysia’s Federal Territories fail to specify
any procedure pertaining toMuslim apostasy at all? As a matter concerning both law
and “national” politics, this is the policy-oriented administrative question that
framed the experience of Lina Joy.
C. Politicizing Apostasy: Federal–State Relations
To explain why the introduction of specific procedures governing Muslim apostasy
in Malaysia’s Federal Territories was so difficult and, indeed, why the resulting
administrative gap (stemming from a persistent statutory lacuna) was seen as “rea-
sonable” by Malaysia’s Federal Court, we argue that the problem of religious free-
dom in Malaysia must be understood in light of (a) historical and political factors
pertaining to the country’s constitutional architecture and (b) a set of rather delicate
(and, to some extent, unresolved) political issues involving the distribution of federal
and state-level powers in matters concerning religion.
Malaysia’s scheme of federalism is center-heavy. Even a cursory assessment of the
legislative distribution of powers in the constitution is enough to highlight this fact:
List I of the Ninth Schedule lists twenty-seven matters in which the federal parlia-
ment possesses exclusive competence; List II provides only thirteen matters falling
exclusively to the states. One of these thirteenmatters is Islamic law, but as explained
earlier, there is a very limited area of Islamic law within which individual states can
legislate.95 Despite the common assumption that all matters having to do with Islam
are within the exclusive purview of Malaysian states, and despite the fact that state-
level sultans remain the Heads of Islam in their respective states (owing to a carefully
engineered compromise during the constitution-making process96), the power of the
federal legislature and, thus, the power of the federal government in matters con-
cerning Islam is, as noted earlier, substantial.97 The other point worth reiterating is
that the punitive jurisdiction of Malaysia’s shari‘ah courts is capped by the Syariah
Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965. Limiting the kinds of punishment that
state-level shari‘ah courts can impose, this law emerged from the federal
legislature.98
When it comes to the issue of Muslim apostasy, however, federal–state relations
remain extremely complex. List II reserves to state-level legislatures and the federal
parliament (in the case of the Federal Territories) the power to define and punish
offences by persons professing Islam against the precepts of that religion (including
apostasy). Yet, if Malaysia’s federal parliament were to exercise this power – creating
95 See Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Section I.A.
96 See generally Fernando (n. 16) and Shah (n. 15), chapter 2.
97 Laws on Islamic banking, finance, and insurance, for instance, would fall within the purview of the
federal parliament.
98 See Jaclyn L. Neo and Dian A. H. Shah, “Hudud and the Struggle for Malaysia’s Constitutional Soul,”
Constitutionnet (June 25, 2015), www.constitutionnet.org/news/hudud-and-struggle-malaysias-consti
tutional-soul (accessed May 5, 2016).
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a federal law for the Federal Territories that differed from existing state-level laws on
this issue (either in a more “punitive” or a more “permissive” direction) – questions
would inevitably arise. Article 75 of the constitution clearly states that federal laws
will prevail over any (inconsistent) state-level laws. But, with so many different state-
level laws concerning Muslim apostasy, any exercise of the federal legislative power
needed to address the procedural lacuna facing Lina Joy could be seen as challen-
ging the legislative remit of the states and, specifically, the power of the sultans to
assert their constitutionally defined role as “Heads of Islam” in their respective states.
Indeed, federal legislation in this sensitive area might be seen as an effort to pressure
Malaysia’s state-level sultans to conform to federal standards.
This pressure would not be overlooked by Malaysia’s states, particularly since the
federal government, through JAKIM, has already stepped up its efforts to standardize
“state-level” Islamic laws, including those pertaining to Muslim personal matters
like marriage, divorce, and inheritance. It is notable, however, that this push for
harmonization has not touched the domain of Muslim apostasy (even though the
imposition of capital punishment for unrepentant apostates – a measure that has
been proposed, at various times, in states like Kelantan and Terengganu – is blocked
by Malaysia’s federal Syariah Courts [Criminal Jurisdiction] Act 1965). From an
historical perspective, efforts to encourage centralization in matters pertaining to
Islam remain highly controversial, particularly in light of long-standing frictions
regarding the balance of federal and state-level powers.
Malaysia’s sultans explicitly raised strong reservations during Malaysia’s pre-inde-
pendence constitution-making process regarding the inclusion of a constitutional
provision cementing Islam as the religion of the Malayan federation, fearing that
such a provision would shift the locus of authority in Islamic matters to the central
government. Indeed, it is only after these sultans received clear assurances that their
regional authority in matters regarding Islam would not be lost that they agreed to
the inclusion of this provision. In fact Malaysia’s sultans were assured that, even if a
federal-level government department were established for religious matters, that
department would not exist under the purview of an elected federal government –
as it does (in the form of JAKIM) today. They were assured that such a department
would only serve to “coordinate” the federation and the states under the purview of
Malaysia’s rotating king (i.e., the Yang di-Pertuan Agong).99
Since the earliest days of the constitution-making process, Malaysia’s regional
sultans have registered persistent concerns about the effect of non-Muslim proselyt-
ism on Muslims, suggesting that questions of Muslim apostasy were already a
sensitive issue.100 This is not surprising insofar as Malaysia’s sultans derive both
their religious authority and political legitimacy from “[M]uslim notions of …
99 Shah (n. 15), 92.
100 Ibid., 112. It was for this reason that the sultans objected to the inclusion the right to propagate one’s
religion in the constitution.
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rule.”101 Indeed, while the federal legislature may well pass laws to regulate the
process of Muslim apostasy in Malaysia’s Federal Territories, doing so would almost
certainly push the federal government into an enormous political clash. It would,
quite simply, stir up a host of questions about the shape of Malaysia’s constitutional
federalism, with specific reference to religious policymaking and the religious
prerogatives of Malaysia’s state-level sultans. The statutory gap facing Lina Joy was
awkward; but, for historical, constitutional, and political reasons, it is not difficult to
understand why the deferential behavior of the NRD, vis-a`-vis state-level procedures,
was considered administratively “reasonable.”
To guarantee harmony between the versions of Islamic law applied in different
units of the Malaysian federation, including the Federal Territories, some have
suggested that Malaysia should have a GrandMufti “whose opinions would bind all
Muslims.”102 However, Farid Shuaib reports that, so far, this suggestion has received
a negative response: “The federal government could not establish such an office,” he
explains, “unless the states voluntarily agree to subordinate their Muftis to a federal
Mufti,” and this “the states have resisted.”103 Turning specifically to the pattern of
statutory inaction that frustrated Lina Joy, Shuaib notes that the creation of a Grand
Mufti able to make fatwas for the whole of Malaysia would require a constitutional
amendment. But this is unlikely. Malaysia’s regional sultans, he explains, “have
shown their readiness to be firm in situation[s] related to their position.”104
The constitutional amendment that, according to Shuaib, would be needed
beforeMalaysia’s parliament could specify a “national” punishment for the so-called
“crime” of Muslim apostasy was not introduced during the fifty years that UMNO
and its BN coalition held the requisite two-thirds majority in parliament (1957–
2008). With the demise of that supermajority in 2008, the policymaking context
regulating Muslim apostasy and, therein, the operationalization of religious free-
dom, has shifted. In short, the possibility of introducing such a constitutional
amendment and, then, a “national” law governing Muslim apostasy has declined.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to freely choose one’s religion (i.e., religious self-identification) and the
formal procedures underpinning a state’s recognition of one’s faith are closely
linked. They are tied together by administrative procedures, but those procedures
101 See M. B. Hooker, “Muhammadan Law and Islamic Law,” in M. B. Hooker (ed.), Islam in South-
East Asia (Brill, 1997), 171, and Donald L., Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of
California Press, 2000), 226.
102 Shuaib, “The Islamic Legal System in Malaysia” (n. 20), 111.
103 Ibid. As Shuaib points out, “[t]here is a National Fatwa Committee, which was set up in 1970 and is
currently placed within the Department of Islam of Malaysia in the Prime Minister’s Office. This
Committee may deliberate on issues relating to Islam but its recommendation … is not binding on
the states.”
104 Shuaib, “Strengthening Administrative Institutions of Islamic Law” (n. 20), 451.
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vary from place to place in ways that directly shape the operationalization of
religious freedom as a fundamental constitutional right. In Malaysia, the operatio-
nalization of religious freedom is shaped by specific administrative procedures, but
historical, constitutional, and political contingencies have shaped the way in which
those procedures are designed from state to state within the country, including their
absence in Malaysia’s Federal Territories and certain other states. These contingen-
cies also explain Malaysia’s failure to close the procedural gap that prevented Lina
Joy from transforming her religious self-identification into a case of state recognition.
Conventionally, religious freedom is understood as an inherently negative right,
meaning that states must not encroach on an individual’s freedom to choose or
change her religion. However, insofar as this right is guaranteed by national con-
stitutions and international human rights instruments, this particular formulation
targeting the forum internum fails to appreciate the relationship between religious
self-identification and the administrative procedures underpinning state recogni-
tion. The central issue is this: at what point do the bureaucratic procedures under-
pinning the state’s recognition of one’s religious self-identification become
administratively “unreasonable” in ways that constitute an abuse of one’s funda-
mental rights?
Given the intricacies of Malaysia’s legal system, one might appreciate the need to
formalize the procedures governing conversion into or out of Islam. For specific
historical reasons, the Malaysian constitution carves out a realm of specific (and
exclusive) jurisdiction for state-level shari‘ah courts in matters pertaining to Islam,
suggesting that, at the very least, an official record of one’s religious identity is
necessary to ensure that the application of shari‘ah-based laws is strictly limited to
those professing the religion of Islam. Yet, building on this limitation, there have
been several cases – particularly in divorce and custody battles – where a spouse
converts into Islam and then claims that, insofar as he or she is now governed by
shari‘ah, prior obligations under civil law (e.g., obligations related to spousal main-
tenance) are no longer deemed to apply.105 Lina Joy reminds us that, legally speak-
ing, forms of religious identification are closely tied to formal administrative
procedures underpinning state recognition.
To obtain state recognition, asking Lina Joy to follow a set of procedures that did
not yet exist may seem (normatively) unreasonable – in many ways, an overzealous
restriction on Joy’s fundamental right to religious freedom. However, the case of
Lina Joy reminds us that there is much to be gained (analytically) from a detailed
empirical understanding of the relationship between religious self-identification and
historically contingent questions of procedure – historically contingent questions of
administrative procedure that underpin each state’s recognition of religious identity
and, therein, its manifestations within the public realm. It is this empirical
105 See, e.g., Subashini a/p Rajasingam v. Saravanan Thangathoray &Other Appeals [2008] 2,Malayan
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understanding of historically and politically embedded debates about administrative
procedure (and administrative “reasonableness”) that, we argue, deserves more
attention among those with an interest in the operationalization of religious freedom
worldwide.
The absence of explicit statutory provisions governing Muslim apostasy in
Malaysia’s Federal Territories was not enough to persuade Malaysia’s Federal
Court that the regulatory requirements set by Malaysia’s National Registration
Department (requiring a certificate of apostasy from the relevant shari‘ah court)
were “unreasonable.” On the contrary, the Court held that it was administratively
reasonable for the NRD to require this certificate because apostasy was amatter to be
addressed according to (state-level) Islamic principles. Requiring such a certificate,
in other words, was (a) within the ambit of the administrative discretion afforded to
the National Registration Department and (b) not so illogical (in Malaysia) as to fail
a “Wednesbury” reasonableness test.
The question of administrative reasonableness in Lina Joy also implicated a rather
sensitive feature of interbranch constitutional politics. Indeed, for specific historical,
political, and constitutional reasons, the Federal Court refused to encroach on
Malaysia’s state-level shari’ah courts in matters pertaining to Islam. Moreover, it
was conscious not to disrupt Malaysia’s approach to center–state relations in legis-
lative and judicial matters specifically pertaining to shari‘ah. The Court believed
that there was a clear constitutional mandate under the Ninth Schedule for
Malaysia’s state-level shari‘ah courts to address these matters, even in the absence
of any statutory provisions granting jurisdiction to those courts. Indeed, this exercise
of judicial restraint in the face of complex political considerations is not unusual;
Malaysia’s Federal Court simply concluded that the NRD had acted “reasonably” in
the sense of arriving at a course of administrative action that made sense within the
context of Malaysian history and politics, theMalaysian constitution, andMalaysian
administrative law.
In the end, the Federal Court’s approach inLina Joy had the effect of prohibiting –
whether intentionally or not – the formalization of Lina Joy’s choice of religion, i.e.,
her religious self-identification. Even if Joy had approached the shari’ah courts of
Malaysia’s Federal Territories, however, it is unclear which “procedures” she would
have been expected to complete to obtain a certificate of apostasy. Without further
legislative action, as demanded by the courts, her fundamental rights could not be
operationalized and, as a result, her right to religious freedom was denied.
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